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COMMENT
DOES "SECOND" MEAN SECOND?:
EXAMINING THE SPLIT AMONG THE
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS IN

INTERPRETING AEDPA'S "SECOND OR
SUCCESSIVE" LIMITATIONS ON

HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS
I. INTRODUCTION

The writ of habeas corpus, known as the "Great Writ,"' allows an
individual in custody under the judgment of a state or federal court
conviction to challenge his conviction or custody in federal court on
the basis that such violates the Constitution. In 1996, Congress3
passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), which drastically limits the ability of federal courts to
review and grant writs of habeas corpus.4 One such limitation on
habeas petitions introduced by AEDPA is the restriction on the ability
of federal courts to hear claims presented in "second or successive"
habeas corpus petitions.' AEDPA prohibits the filing of "second or
I

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,536 (2004).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).
3 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
4 For an overview of AEDPA and its changes to habeas corpus law, see 1 RANDY HERTZ
& JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3.2 (5th ed.
2005); Larry W. Yackle, A Primeron the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381
(1996).
5 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Although the restrictions in §
2244(b) and § 2255 are similar, this Comment focuses on the limitations of § 2244(b), which
govern habeas petitions filed under § 2254 by persons imprisoned under state court convictions.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) states:
(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application
under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application
under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed
unless2
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successive" habeas petitions unless the claims raised in the petition
fall into one of two very narrow exceptions.6 To enforce these
limitations, AEDPA sets up a "gatekeeping" 7 function for circuit
courts, which requires the courts to prescreen "second or successive"
habeas petitions and grant an authorization before the inmate may file
the petition in district court. 8 Despite the stringent new rules
governing "second or successive" habeas petitions, AEDPA did not
define what constitutes a "second or successive" habeas petition. 9
Prior to AEDPA, the ability of a petitioner to file a subsequent
application for a writ of habeas corpus was determined by the "abuse
of the writ" standard.10 This doctrine, "define[d] the circumstances in
which federal courts decline to entertain a claim presented for the first
'
time in a second or subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus."'
As the Supreme Court explained, "the doctrine of abuse of the writ
refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable principles

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Both § 2244(b) and § 2255 contain limitations on "second or successive"
habeas applications, and generally, courts have not viewed any distinction between § 2244(b)'s
use of the phrase "second or successive" and § 2255's use of that phrase. See, e.g., United States
v. Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d 862, 864 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[A]lthough the application of
'second or successive' in section 2255 is in question in the case sub judice, we will refer to
cases involving section 2254 as relevant to our analysis."); United States v. Flores, 135 F.3d
1000, 1002 n.7 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Because of the similarity of the actions under sections 2254
and 2255, they have traditionally been read in pari materia where the context does not indicate
that would be improper.") (citing McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856-58 (1994)). Thus,
while this Comment focuses on the limitations of § 2244(b), some of the cases cited in this
Comment involve discussions of § 2255's "second or successive" limitations.
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
7 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996) ("[AEDPAI creates a "gatekeeping"
mechanism for the consideration of second or successive applications in district court.").
s E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3); 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 28.3a; Bryan A.
Stevenson, The Politics of Fearand Death: Successive Problems in Capital Federal Habeas
Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 699, 706-11 (2002).
9 E.g., Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Section 2244, however,
does not define what constitutes a 'second or successive' petition."); David R. Dow et al., The
Extraordinary Execution of Billy Vickers, the Banality of Death, and the Demise of
Post-ConvictionReview, 13 WM. & MARY BtL RTs. J. 521, 560 (2004). ("The statute does not
define that phrase.").
10 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 28.2b; Stevenson, supra, note 8, at 706-11.
1 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,470 (1991).
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informed and controlled
by historical usage, statutory developments,
12
decisions."
judicial
and
In 1996, however, Congress changed habeas law with the passage
of AEDPA and its new limitations on "second or successive" habeas
corpus applications.1 3 Two months after the law was enacted, in
Felker v. Turpin14 the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to
constitutionality of AEDPA's restrictions on successive habeas
petitions.' 5 The Supreme Court, however, did not interpret AEDPA's
"second or successive" language codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) or
determine what constitutes a "second or successive" habeas
application. 16
As a result of AEDPA not defining "second or successive" 1 7 and8
the Supreme Court not providing a clear interpretation of the phrase,'
the circuit courts have applied different interpretations of the phrase
and reached different results in determining which habeas petitions
are "second or successive" under AEDPA. t9 Some circuits interpret
"second or successive" as a term of art that incorporates the
pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ standard,2 ° while other circuits reject
this interpretation and interpret "second or successive" according to
the plain meaning of those terms. 21 Moreover, the case law is replete
with different and inconsistent interpretations of AEDPA's "second
or successive" limitations.22 These differences and inconsistencies
exist not only among the different circuits but also among different
decisions within certain individual circuits.23 Most courts and
commentators, however, have not recognized these divergent
interpretations of "second or successive."
This Comment reviews these conflicting decisions to reveal the
split among the circuits and the inconsistency within certain
12Id. at 489.
13

2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 28.2b; Stevenson, supra, note 8, at 706-11.

14518 U.S. 651 (1996).
5 Id. at 664 (noting that the "new restrictions on successive petitions constitute a
modified res judicata rule, a restraint on what is called in habeas corpus practice 'abuse of the
writ"').
16See id. at 662--64.
17See Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 816 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Section 2244, however,
does not define what constitutes a 'second or successive' petition.").

18See infra Part 11.
19See infra Part I1.
20 See, e.g., James v. Walsh, 308 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2002) ("To interpret the term

"second or successive," courts look to the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine.").
21 See, e.g., In re Page, 179 F.3d 1024, 1025 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the abuse of the
writ standard "was replaced by the new criteria [under AEDPA] and passed out of the law ....
'The doctrine of abuse of the writ is defunct."' (quoting Burris v. Parke, 95 F.3d 465, 469 (7th
Cir. 1996) (en banc))).
22 See infra Part III.
21 See infra Part Ill.
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individual circuits regarding the interpretation of "second or
successive" under AEDPA. Part II of this Comment reviews the
Supreme Court decisions that offer insight into a proper interpretation
of "second or successive" contained in § 2244(b). Part III reviews the
decisions of the courts of appeals, highlighting the two different
interpretations of "second or successive" followed by different
circuits. Part III also reveals the inconsistency within the decisions of
individual circuits regarding the interpretation of "second or
successive." Finally, Part IV explains why the interpretation of
"second or successive" adopted by some circuits is an improper
interpretation of AEDPA's "second or successive" limitations and
provides support for interpreting AEDPA's "second or successive"
language as a term of art that incorporates the pre-AEDPA abuse of
the writ doctrine.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS INTERPRETING AEDPA's
"SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE" LIMITATIONS

Since AEDPA's passage, the Supreme Court has considered
whether a particular habeas application is "second or successive"
under section 2244(b) in three cases.24 In each of those decisions,
however, the Court does not supply an interpretation of "second or
successive" that provides clear guidance to aid lower courts in
determining whether other habeas applications are "second or
successive" under section 2244(b). This section reviews these
Supreme Court decisions and details how each case provides only
limited guidance for the circuit courts to interpret AEDPA's "second
or successive" limitations.
The Supreme Court first considered whether a particular habeas
petition was "second or successive" under AEDPA in Stewart v.
Martinez-Villareal.25 Prior to AEDPA's passage, Martinez-Villareal
filed a habeas petition that included a claim under Ford v.
Wainwright2 6 that he was incompetent to be executed. 27 His Ford
claim was dismissed as premature and his other claims were
eventually denied on the merits. 28 The State then obtained a warrant
24 See Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000);
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998).
25

523 U.S. 637.

477 U.S. 399 (1986). In Ford, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits a state from executing an inmate who is insane. Id. at 410. Accordingly, claims by
inmates that they cannot be executed because they are insane or incompetent are frequently
referred to as Fordclaims. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra, note 8, at 740-42.
27 Martinez-Villareal,523 U.S. at 640.
28 The district court initially granted Martinez-Villareal a writ of habeas corpus, but the
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's granting of the writ. Id.; Martinez-Villarealv. Lewis,
26
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for his execution after AEDPA became effective, and
Martinez-Villareal
filed another habeas petition reasserting his Ford
29
claim.

The State argued that Martinez-Villareal's subsequent habeas
petition was "second or successive" under the plain meaning of §
2244(b) because he had already fully litigated a habeas petition in
federal court. 30 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this
argument. 31 The Court noted that if the state's "interpretation of
'second or successive' were correct, the implications for habeas
practice would be far reaching and seemingly perverse.' 32 Instead of
adopting the state's interpretation, the Court held Mr.
Martinez-Villareal's Ford claim was not a "second or successive"
petition under § 2244(b) because the claim "would not be barred
under any form of res judicata. ' '33 "To hold otherwise," the Court
stated, "would mean that a dismissal of a first habeas petition for
technical procedural reasons would bar the prisoner from ever
obtaining federal habeas review." 34 Justices Scalia and Thomas both
dissented and argued that the Court
ignored the plain language of §
35
2244(b) in reaching its decision.
The Court failed to provide a clear or comprehensive interpretation
of what constitutes a "second or successive" habeas application under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) in Martinez-Villareal. Indeed, the Court left
unresolved a question that would have provided more guidance to
lower courts on what constitutes a "second or successive" habeas
application. 36 Instead, the Court resolved the case based on the unique

80 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1996).
29 Martinez-Villareal,523 U.S. at 640.
30 Id. at 643.
31 Id. at 643-44.
32 Id. at 644.
33
34

Id. at 645.
Id.

35 Justice Scalia opined: "The Court today flouts the unmistakable language of the statute
to avoid what it calls a 'perverse' result. There is nothing 'perverse' about the result that the
statute commands, except that it contradicts pre-existing judge-made law, which it was precisely
the purpose of the statute to change." Id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Justice Thomas reiterated the point, stating that the "reasons offered by the Court for
disregarding the plain meaning of the statute are unpersuasive." Id. at 649 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
36 In the only footnote in the opinion, the Court noted that it was not confronted with a
situation where a habeas petitioner raises a claim for the first time in a petition after his initial
petition is rejected. Martinez-Villareal,523 U.S. at 645 n*. Therefore, the court concluded: "we
have no occasion to decide whether such a filing would be a 'second or successive habeas
corpus application' within the meaning of AEDPA." Id. Answering this question would have
required the Court to provide a clearer interpretation of "second or successive" under AEDPA.
Instead, because the Court did not resolve this question, the circuit courts have split in
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procedural history of the case.37 As a result, the lower federal courts
have differed in their understanding of Martinez-Villareal's holding
and have reached different interpretations of AEDPA's "second or
successive" limitations as a result.38
Two years after Martinez-Villareal, the Supreme Court decided
Slack v. McDaniel,39 which provides further guidance into what
constitutes a "second or successive" habeas petition. In Slack, the
Court held that a "habeas petition filed in district court after an initial
habeas petition was unadjudicated on its merits and dismissed [by the
district court] for failure to exhaust state remedies [was] not a second
or successive petition."0 Although the Court's decision was governed
by pre-AEDPA law, the majority made a point to note that the
definition of second or successive would not be any different under
AEDPA. 4 1 To support this proposition, the Court cited
Martinez-Villareal,which it noted used "pre-AEDPA law to interpret
AEDPA's provision governing 'second or successive habeas
applications."' 42 Justice Scalia again dissented from this portion of the
Court's holding and restated his belief that "the Court produce[d]...
a distortion of the natural meaning of the term 'second or

successive.'43

In Burton v. Stewart,44 the Court once more addressed whether a
particular habeas petition was "second or successive," but again, its
holding does not provide much guidance for determining whether a
habeas application that does not fit the unique factual circumstances
presented in that case is "second or successive." In Burton, in a per
curiam decision, the Court held that a habeas petitioner who raises
exhausted and unexhausted claims in an initial habeas petition and

answering this question and in interpreting "second or successive" under AEDPA. Compare,
e.g., Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that a petitioner may raise a Ford
claim in a numerically second habeas petition even if the Fordclaim was not raised in his initial
habeas petition), with In re Provenzano, 215 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2000) (barring a petitioner
from raising a Fordclaim in a numerically second petition because the petitioner did not raise
the Fordclaim in his initial habeas petition).
37 See Martinez-Villareal,523 U.S. at 643-45 (majority opinion) (basing its holding in
part on the fact that Martinez-Villareal had raised his Ford claim in his first habeas petition but
it was dismissed procedurally); see also Stevenson, supra note 8, at 747 ("The Court avoided
deciding the broad issues in the case by, in essence, elevating an aspect of the procedural history
into a ground for decision.").
38 See infra notes 66-70, 78, 90-91, 105-06 and accompanying text.
39 529 U.S. 473 (2000).
40Id. at 485-86.
41 Id. at 486.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 490-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44 127 S.Ct. 793 (2007).

2007]

DOES "SECOND" MEAN SECOND?

1013

proceeds to adjudicate only the exhausted claims cannot "later assert
that a subsequent petition is not 'second or successive' precisely
because his new claims were unexhausted at the time he filed his first
petition. ' 45 The Court delivered this narrow holding while passing on
the opportunity to delineate the proper approach to determining
whether a habeas petition is "second or successive" under § 2244(b).
In Burton, the Ninth Circuit determined that Burton's habeas petition
was not "second or successive" based on pre-AEDPA law.46 Instead
of deciding whether the Ninth Circuit was correct in looking to
pre-AEDPA law to determine whether Burton's habeas petition was
"second or successive" under AEDPA, the Supreme Court assumed
this determination was correct without deciding the issue.47 The Court
stated: "We assume for purposes of this case, without deciding, that
the Ninth Circuit's ... approach to determining whether a petition is
'second or successive' is correct." 48 Thus, once again the Court
expressly avoided a direct opportunity to delineate the proper
approach to determining whether a habeas petition is "second or
successive" under § 2244(b).
Reviewing Martinez-Villareal, Slack, and Burton, it is clear that
the Court did not provide a broad or conclusive interpretation of
"second or successive" under AEDPA in any of those decisions.
Instead, the decisions provide a definitive determination of whether a
particular habeas application is "second or successive" only if that
habeas application fits squarely into one of the unique factual
scenarios before the Court in those three cases. Accordingly, these
decisions do not provide a clear interpretation regarding what
constitutes a "second or successive" habeas application under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b).
Il. THE Two APPROACHES OF THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS TO
INTERPRETING

AEDPA's "SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE" LIMITATIONS

As discussed in the previous section, the Supreme Court has not
provided a clear interpretation of what constitutes a "second or
successive" habeas application under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Moreover,
AEDPA does not define what constitutes a "second or successive"
habeas petition. 49 As a result, the circuit courts, left to interpret the
45 Id. at 797.

Id. at 796-97. The Ninth Circuit relied on McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), in
holding that "Burton had a 'legitimate excuse for failing to raise' his [unexhausted claims] in the
[initial] petition." Id. at 797.
47Id.
8 Id.
49 See supra note 9.
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phrase individually, have split on the proper interpretation of the
phrase and reached different results in determining which habeas
petitions are "second or successive. ' 5° Following the guidance
provided by Martinez-Villareal and Slack, some circuits interpret
"second or successive" as a term of art that incorporates the
pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ standard,5 1 while other circuits reject
this interpretation and interpret "second or successive" according to
the plain meaning of the terms.52 Additionally, other circuits have
interpreted "second or successive" differently in different cases,
sometimes interpreting it to incorporate the pre-AEDPA standard, and
other times interpreting it literally.53 This section reviews the various
decisions of the courts of appeals concerning what constitutes a
"second or successive" habeas petition.
A. Circuits That Interpret "Second or Successive" as a Term of Art
That Incorporatesthe Pre-AEDPA Abuse of the Writ Doctrine

The majority of circuits, when faced with the issue, reject a literal
reading of "second or successive" in § 2244(b), and instead hold that
AEDPA's "second or successive" language is a term of art that
54
incorporates the pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ principles. The First,
5
Second, 5 Third, 56 Eighth, 57 Ninth, 58 and Tenth Circuits 59 have all
50

See infra notes 56-65, 76-88 and accompanying text.

5' See, e.g., James v. Walsh, 308 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2002) ("To interpret the term

"second or successive," courts look to the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine.").
52 See, e.g., In re Page, 179 F.3d 1024, 1025 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the abuse of the
writ standard "was replaced by the new criteria [under AEDPA] and passed out of the law ....
'The doctrine of abuse of the writ is defunct."' (quoting Burris v. Parke, 95 F.3d 465, 469 (7th
Cir. 1996) (en banc))).
53 See infra notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Raineri v. United States, 233 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2000) ("'The phrase
'second or successive petition' is a term of art,' designed to avoid abuse of the writ." (quoting
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,486 (2000))).
55See, e.g., James v. Walsh, 308 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2002) ("AEDPA does not define
what constitutes a 'second or successive' petition. Courts have uniformly rejected a literal
reading of Section 2244, concluding that a numerically second petition does not necessarily
constitute a 'second' petition for purposes of AEDPA. To interpret the term 'second or
successive,' courts look to the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine.") (internal citations
omitted).
56 See, e.g., Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[W]e find that the
abuse of the writ doctrine retains viability as a means of determining when a petition should be
deemed 'second or successive' under the [AEDPA] statute. We are supported in this view by the
fact that, notwithstanding the AEDPA's passage, our sister circuits uniformly have continued to
interpret 'second or successive' with reference to the pre-AEDPA 'abuse of the writ' doctrine..
. The abuse of the writ doctrine dictates that we should treat the term 'second or successive' as
a term of art, which is not to be read literally.").
57 See, e.g., Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2001) ("[lIt is generally
acknowledged that the interpretation of 'second or successive' involves the application of
pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-wit principles.").
58See, e.g., Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2002) ("AEDPA does not
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uniformly and consistently followed this interpretation. The Second
Circuit's holding in James v. Walsh6° captures the general view of
these circuits:
AEDPA does not define what constitutes a 'second or
successive' petition. Courts have uniformly rejected a literal
reading of Section 2244, concluding that a numerically
second petition does not necessarily constitute a 'second'
petition for purposes of AEDPA. To interpret the term
'second or successive,' courts look to the pre-AEDPA
abuse-of-the-writ doctrine.61

Under this interpretation a habeas "'application is not second or
62
successive simply because it follows an earlier federal petition.'
Instead, a later petition is "second or successive," and thus subject to
AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions, only if that petition: "1) raises a
claim challenging the petitioner's conviction or sentence that was or
could have been raised in an 63earlier petition; or 2) otherwise
constitutes and abuse of the writ."

In interpreting "second or successive" in § 2244(b) as a term of art
that incorporates the pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ principles, these
circuits rely on the Supreme Court's decisions of Slack v. McDaniel
64
and Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal to support their interpretation.
Although neither Slack nor Martinez-Villareal expressly adopted this
interpretation of "second or successive," these circuits rely on the
rationale and the language used by the Supreme Court in those
decisions to support their interpretation of "second or successive" as a
term of art under AEDPA.6 5 The Eighth Circuit, for instance, noted

define the terms 'second or successive.' The Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and our sister
circuits have interpreted the concept incorporated in this term of art as derivative of the 'abuse
of the writ' doctrine developed in pre-AEDPA cases.").
59See, e.g., Reeves v. Little, 120 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir. 1997) ("In determining what
is a 'second or successive' motion under the statute, the circuits which have reviewed this
question use the 'abuse of the writ' standard in effect before AEDPA was enacted.").
- 308 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2002).
61 Id. at 167 (internal citations omitted).
62 Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Cain, 137 F.3d
234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998)).
63 In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998).
64 See, e.g., Benchoff, 404 F.3d at 817 (citing Slack); James v. Walsh, 308 F.3d 162, 167
(2d Cir. 2002) (citing Martinez-Villareal);Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2002)
(citing Martinez-Villareal); Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 723 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing
Martinez-Villareal); Raneri v. United States, 233 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Slack);
United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 44 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Martinez-Villareal).
65 See, e.g., Benchoff, 404 F.3d at 817 (noting that Slack "suggest[ed] that the definition of
second or successive would be same under AEDPA as under pre-AEDPA law"); Crouch, 251
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that "[t]he lesson of Slack and Martinez-Villareal ...is that "second
or successive" remains a term of art that must be given meaning by
reference to both the body of case law developed before the
enactment of
AEDPA and the policies that prompted AEDPA's
66
enactment."
Even though the Supreme Court did not expressly hold AEDPA's
"second or successive" language incorporates the abuse of the writ
principles, its reasoning in Martinez-Villareal and Slack has been
viewed by many circuit courts and commentators as endorsing this
interpretation.67 One commentator noted:
[The]
majority
[in Martinez-Villareal] essentially
acknowledged [that] a literal reading of the words of the
statute . . .would have compelled the conclusion that the
restrictions applied to Martinez-Villareal's numerically
"second" petition. [Therefore,] the Court read the statute to
incorporate the not-entirely-numerical definition of . . .
multiple petitions68 that federal courts had developed under
pre-AEDPA law.

Moreover, as demonstrated above, a majority of the circuits have
relied upon the Supreme Court's reasoning in Slack and
Martinez-Villareal in interpreting "second or successive" under
AEDPA to incorporate the pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ standards.
Most of these circuits have generally stated that their sister circuits
are "uniform" in interpreting "second or successive" under AEDPA to
incorporate pre-AEDPA principles. 69 None of these circuits have
F.3d at 723 (noting that Martinez-Villareal "look[ed] to pre-AEDPA law to determine" a
post-AEDPA § 2244(b) "second or successive" issue).
66 Crouch, 251 F.3d at 725 (holding that, in light of Slack and Martinez-Villareal, a
petitioner's numerically second habeas petition is not "second or successive" under AEDPA if it
could not have been raised in an earlier petition or does not otherwise constitute an abuse of the
writ).
67 See, e.g., supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text; Dow et al., supra note 9, at 560
("Consequently, the Court has interpreted the AEDPA's provisions governing 'second or
successive' habeas application by looking to the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine."
(citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637
(1998); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996))).
68 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 3.2, at 120-21 n.37.
69 See, e.g., Benchoff, 404 F.3d at 817 ("[O]ur sister circuits uniformly have continued to
interpret 'second or successive' with reference to the pre-AEDPA 'abuse of the writ' doctrine.")
(emphasis added); James v. Walsh, 308 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Courts have uniformly
rejected a literal reading of Section 2244 ....) (emphasis added); Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d 895,
897-98 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit, and its sister circuits
are uniform in this interpretation); Crouch, 251 F.3d at 723 ("Courts considering the
construction of § 2244(b) have uniformly rejected a literal reading.") (emphasis added).
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recognized any contrary interpretations of "second or successive" by
other circuits. 70 The other circuit courts, however, have not uniformly
accepted or applied the interpretation of "second or successive"
adopted by the majority of the circuits. To the contrary, the Seventh
Circuit has flatly rejected the interpretation of "second or successive"
adopted by the majority of circuits, 7' and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits have
each applied varying interpretations of
"second or successive. '7 2
B. Seventh CircuitInterprets "Second or Successive" According to
the Plain Meaning of the Terms
Far from being uniform with the majority interpretation of "second
or successive" as a term of art that incorporates the pre-AEDPA abuse
of the writ doctrine, the Seventh Circuit has expressly rejected this
interpretation. Soon after the passage of AEDPA, the Seventh Circuit,
sitting en banc, stated its view that "[t]he doctrine of abuse of the writ
is defunct" in light of AEDPA's change in the law.73 This statement
shows a clear split among the circuits.
The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed this statement in In re Page,74 and
expressly rejected the interpretation of "second or successive" taken
by the majority of circuits. In In re Page the Seventh Circuit held that
a habeas petition was "second or successive" under AEDPA even
though the claim raised in the petition could not have been included
in the petitioner's first habeas petition. 75 The opinion adheres to the
view advocated by the dissenters in Martinez-Villarealand Slack that
"second or successive" should be read literally according to the
natural meaning of the terms.76 The court rejected the petitioner's
argument that his numerically second petition should be treated as a
first petition so long as it is not an abuse of the writ. 77 Instead, the
court held that the concept of abuse of the writ "was replaced by the
new criteria [under AEDPA] and passed out of the law. 78 The court
reiterated:
The doctrine of abuse of the writ is defunct. The term derives
from section 2244(b), now wholly superseded by the new law
See cases cited supra note 71.
See infra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
72 See infra notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
73 Burris v. Parke, 95 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
74 179 F.3d 1024.
75 Id. at 1025.
76 See supra notes 36, 45 and accompanying text.
77 In re Page, 179 F.3d at 1025.
78Id.
70
71
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[i.e., AEDPA], which nowhere uses the term. There is no
longer any statutory handle for the doctrine, and in any event
its role seems wholly preempted by the detailed79provisions of
the new statute concerning successive petitions.
The court also expressed its disagreement with the result that
would occur if it adopted the "dicta" of the other circuits, which the
petitioner argued supported his argument that AEDPA's "second or
successive" language incorporated pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ
principles. 80 The court noted this interpretation would allow a habeas
petitioner "to choose between the old abuse of the writ concept and
the new statutory concept [of AEDPA] .81 As the court stated:
Under the old law, a petition found to be an abuse of the writ
was barred. Period. Under the dicta, a petition that would
have been an abuse of the writ under the old law is, under
AEDPA, a second or successive petition-which means that
it is not automatically barred, that the prisoner can file it even
though it is by definition an abuse of the writ,
if he can fit it
82
into one of the categories of the new statute.
The court found that this interpretation of AEDPA "is a slap in the
face of Congress.' 8 3
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit recently reaffirmed In re Page in
Lambert v. Davis,84 despite the dissent's view that the "Supreme
Court's decision in Slack v. McDaniel calls into question the
reasoning of this court in In re Page.''85
Therefore, while a majority of circuits are "uniform" in
interpreting "second or successive" to incorporate the pre-AEDPA
abuse of the writ principles, the Seventh Circuit has unequivocally
rejected this interpretation of "second or successive" under AEDPA.
There is a clear split among the circuits regarding the proper
interpretation of "second or successive" in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).

79 Id. (quoting Burris v. Parke, 95 F.3d 465,469 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
80

Id.

81 Id. at 1026.
82

Id. at 1025-26.

83 Id. at 1026.

449 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2006).
Lambert v. Davis, 449 F.3d at 780 n.1 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted), reh'g en banc denied, No. 05-2610, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 21329 (7th Cir. Aug. 14,
2006), cert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3497 (2007).
84
85

2007]

DOES "SECOND" MEAN SECOND?

1019

C. Circuits That Are Inconsistentin Interpreting "Second or
Successive"
Not only is there a split among the circuits regarding the proper
interpretation of "second or successive," but there is also
inconsistency among the panel decisions within certain individual
circuits regarding the interpretation of "second or successive."
Different panels within the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits
have each applied various interpretations of "second or successive" in
different cases.86

The Fourth Circuit has yet to expressly adopt or reject the majority
interpretation of "second or successive" in § 2244(b). The Fourth
Circuit generally rejects the majority approach and interprets "second
or successive" according to the plain meaning of those terms when
determining if a subsequent habeas petition falls under the
gatekeeping provisions of § 2244(b).87 Likewise, it also has rejected
the majority of circuits' expansive reading of Slack and
Martinez-Villereal and the holdings that a subsequent habeas petition
is not "second or successive" if it raises a claim that could not have
been raised in the previous petition.8 8 The Fourth Circuit, however,
has not been uniform in this interpretation. In at least one panel
decision the Fourth Circuit rejected a literal reading of "second or
successive" to hold that a numerically second habeas petition under §
2255 is not "second or successive" when the first habeas petition was
used only to reinstate the petitioner's direct appeal. 89
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit has not been uniform in
its interpretation of "second or successive." An early Sixth Circuit
decision, issued soon after the passage of AEDPA, distinguished the
"old law" of abuse of the writ from the "new law" implemented by
AEDPA and seemingly adopted a literal or plain meaning
interpretation of AEDPA's "second or successive" limitations similar
to the Seventh Circuits'. 90 In the more recent decision of In re
6 See infra
87 See, e.g.,

notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
Evans v. Smith, 220 F.3d 306, 322-23 (4th Cir. 2000).
88 See id. (rejecting petitioner's expansive reading of Slack and Maritnez-Villareal and
rejecting the petitioner's argument that his habeas petition was not a "second or successive"
petition under § 2244(b) because he could not have raised the claim in his previous habeas
petition). In contrast, the majority of circuits hold that a petition is not "second or successive" if
it raises a claim that could not have been raised at the time of a prior petition. See, e.g.,
Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[A] subsequent petition ... is clearly
not a 'second or successive' petition within the meaning of § 2244 if the claim [raised in the
petition] had not arisen or could not have been raised at the time of the prior petition.").
89In re Goddard, 170 F.3d 435 (4th Cir. 1999).
90 In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 928-29 (6th Cir. 1997). In In re Hanserd, the Sixth
Circuit noted that while the petitioner would have been permitted to file his subsequent habeas
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Bowen,91 however, instead of following a plain meaning interpretation
of "second or successive," a different panel of the Sixth Circuit
interpreted "second or successive" as a term of art that incorporates
pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ principles.92 Since In re Bowen, two
different panels of the Sixth Circuit have espoused two different
interpretations of "second or successive" under AEDPA. One panel
limited the holding of In re Bowen and strictly applied § 2244(b)'s
limitations to hold that a subsequent petition was "second or
successive" even though it raised a claim that could not have been
raised at the time the petitioner filed his initial habeas petition.93
Thus, that panel decision split from the majority of circuits that hold
that a claim raised in a subsequent petition is not "second or
successive" under AEDPA if that claim could not have been raised in
the petitioner's previous habeas petition.94 A different panel decision,
however, relied on In re Bowen to expressly reject a plain meaning
interpretation of "second or successive" under § 2244(b).95 The court
noted that "[c]ourts have not, however, construed 'second or
successive'

to encompass

all

.

.

.

habeas petitions that are

'numerically' second in the sense that they are literally the second
motion filed. 96 Therefore, like the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit
has not been consistent in its interpretation of "second or successive"
under AEDPA.
In the same manner, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have also been
inconsistent in their interpretation of "second or successive" under
AEDPA. Like the Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit has generally
strictly interpreted "second or successive" according to the plain
meaning of the words in the phrase; 97 it has not followed the holdings
of the majority of circuits that a subsequent habeas petition is not
"second or successive," under pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ

petition under the "old abuse-of-the-writ standard," under AEDPA, the petitioner could not file
the petition because it was a "second or successive" habeas petition. Id.
91 436 F.3d 699 (6th Cir. 2006).
92 In re Bowen, 436 F.3d at 704 (asserting that "not every numerically second petition is
second or successive' for purposes of AEDPA," and that "courts defining 'second or
successive' generally apply abuse of the writ decisions, including those decisions that predated
AEDPA").
93 In re White, No. 06-3306, slip op. at 3-4 (6th Cir. June 19, 2006).
94 See, e.g., Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[A] subsequent
petition.. . is clearly not a 'second or successive' petition within the meaning of § 2244 if the
claim [raised in the petition] had not arisen or could not have been raised at the time of the prior
petition.").
95 Lang v. United States, 474 F.3d 348, 351 (6th Cir. 2007).

% id.
97 See, e.g., In re Medina, 109 F.3d 1556, 1565 (1

th Cir. 1997) (noting that the "plain

terms" of § 2244(b) applied to bar a successive habeas petition).
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principles, if it raises a claim that could not have been raised in a
previous petition.98 Despite the fact that Eleventh Circuit generally
recognizes a distinction between the pre- and post-AEDPA
standards, 99 one panel decision has followed the majority of circuits
in holding that "second or successive" is a term of art that
incorporates the pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ principles. 0 0 That
decision stated: "We agree with the decisions issued by many of our
sister circuits that a petition . . . would not be second or successive
where the claim could not have been raised in an earlier petition and
does not otherwise constitute an abuse of the writ."10' This decision,
adopting the majority rule that is based upon a broad reading of Slack
and Martinez-Villareal's holding, 10 2 is at odds with the Eleventh
a broad reading
Circuit's other decisions that have
103 expressly rejected
of Martinez-Villareal's holding.
Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit has generally
interpreted "second or successive," in accordance with the majority of
the other circuits, as a term of art that incorporates the pre-AEDPA
abuse of the writ standards. t°4 Like the Eleventh Circuit, however, the
Fifth Circuit has rejected this interpretation of "second or successive"
when a numerically second petition raises a Ford claim. 10 5 In these
98 See, e.g., In re Provenzano, 215 F.3d 1233, 1235-36 (11 th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
petitioner failed to meet the requirements of § 2244(b) to permit the filing of his subsequent
habeas petition even though "the factual basis . . . of th[e] claim was not available to
Provenzano at the time he filed his first federal habeas petition .... ").
99 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 366 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir.
2004) (en banc) ('The evolution has been toward greater finality of judgments through
increasingly tight restrictions on second or successive petitions. We have gone from the days of
the more permissive ends of justice and abuse of the writ standards . . . to the present
post-AEDPA times, with a total ban on claims that were presented in a prior petition, §
2244(b)(1), and a near total ban on those that were not, see § 2244(b)(2).").
'0°Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1062 (11th Cir. 2003) ("The term 'second or
successive' remains a term of art that must be given meaning by reference to both the body of
case law developed before the enactment of AEDPA and the policies that prompted AEDPA's
enactment.").
101Id.
102See

supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.

103See, e.g., In re Provenzano, 215 F.3d 1233, 1235-36 (11 th Cir. 2000) (rejecting broad

interpretation of Martinez-Villereal in holding that Martinez-Villarealdid not conflict with In re
Medina, 109 F.3d 1556 (11 th Cir. 1997), which held a petitioner could not raise a Fordclaim in
a numerically second habeas petition).
1°4See, e.g., Crone v. Cockrell, 324 F.3d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[We look to
pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ principles in determining whether Crone's petition is
successive."); In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding a later habeas petition is
"second or successive" when it: "1) raises a claim challenging the petitioner's conviction or
sentence that was or could have been raised in an earlier petition; or 2) otherwise constitutes and
abuse of the writ.").
105See, e.g., Richardson v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
petitioner could not raise a Fordclaim in a numerically second habeas petition even though "the
factual basis for the Ford claim could not have been discovered at the time of the [petitioner's]
first federal habeas [petition]").

1022

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:4

1 6
cases, the Fifth Circuit follows the "plain wording of § 2244(b)" 0
and holds such petitions are "second or successive" even if those
petitions would not constitute an abuse of the writ. t0 7 Therefore, both
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, in some panel decisions, have
followed the majority of circuits in interpreting "second or
successive" as a term of art that incorporates the abuse of the writ
standards. 10 8 In other panel decisions, however, particularly when a
petitioner's subsequent habeas petition raises an incompetency-to-beexecuted claim under Ford v. Wainwright, these same circuits have
rejected this interpretation.10 9 Instead, in these cases, they interpret the
phrase "second or successive" strictly, according to the plain meaning
of the terms.110
In reviewing the decisions of the courts of appeals then, three
points become apparent: First, the First, Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits interpret the term "second or successive" as a term
of art to incorporate the pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ doctrine."' 1
These circuits also mistakenly state that their sister circuits are
"uniform" in reaching this result. 1 2 Second, far from being uniform,
the Seventh Circuit has expressly rejected the interpretation of
"second or successive" adopted by the majority of other circuits.' 1 3

Instead, it has declared that the abuse of the writ doctrine is
"defunct," and interpreted the phrase "second or successive"
according to the plain meaning of those words. 114 Finally, also far
from being uniform, the decisions of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits are not consistent with other decisions issued within
their respective circuits. Different panel decisions in each of these
circuits have interpreted the phrase "second or successive" under
AEDPA in a way that is different from 15and in conflict with decisions
by other panels within the same circuit.1
16In re Davis, 121 F.3d 952, 956 (5th Cir. 1997).
107See, e.g., id. ("Although we agree that § 2244(b) is designed to prevent abuse of the
writ, and will assume that [the petitioner] is seeking to assert his Fordclaim at the first properly
available opportunity, we cannot disregard the plain wording of § 2244(b) in order to create
such an equitable exception.").
108See, e.g., Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1062 (1lth Cir. 2003); In re Cain, 137
F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998).
"09See, e.g., In re Provenzano, 215 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2000); Richardson v. Johnson,
256 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2001).
110
See, e.g., In re Davis, 121 F.3d at 956 ("[Wle cannot disregard the plain wording of §
2244(b) ....");In re Medina, 109 F.3d 1556, 1565 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that the "plain
terms" of § 2244(b) applied to bar a successive habeas petition).
III See supra notes 56--65 and accompanying text.
112See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
13 See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
14 See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
115
See supra notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
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IV.JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERPRETING "SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE"

UNDER AEDPA TO INCORPORATE THE PRE-AEDPA ABUSE OF THE
WRIT PRINCIPLES

The foregoing review of the circuit court decisions displays the
conflict among the circuits in interpreting and applying "second or
successive" under AEDPA. Accordingly, the Supreme Court needs to
provide the courts of appeals with a clear, definitive interpretation of
''second or successive." The Court should definitively define what
constitutes a "second or successive" petition under § 2244(b) in order
to resolve the split among the circuits, to curb the inconsistent
decisions within individual circuits, and to ensure that the circuits
uniformly interpret "second or successive" in the future.
If the Court decides to settle this issue-providing a clear,
definitive interpretation of "second or successive" for the circuits to
apply-it should endorse the prevailing view in the circuit courts: that
the phrase "second or successive" in § 2244(b) is a term of art that
incorporates the pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ doctrine. This
interpretation of "second or successive" is more consistent with the
Court's decisions in Martinez-Villareal and Slack than is a plain
meaning interpretation of the phrase. 1 6 Indeed, both courts and
commentators have noted that this interpretation
"has been strongly
l8
suggested" 117 by the Court's prior decisions.'
Moreover, there are three additional reasons why the interpretation
of "second or successive" as a term of art should be adopted over a
literal reading of that phrase. First, interpreting "second or
successive" to incorporate the abuse of the writ principles permits
federal courts to hear claims of constitutional violations that would
otherwise be barred by § 2244(b) if "second or successive" were read
literally. The purpose of AEDPA's gatekeeping provisions, codified
in 28 U.S.C. § 2244, was "to restrict habeas petitions from taking
multiple bites at the apple."'1 9 In adopting a literal reading of "second
6

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S.
637 (1998); see also supranotes 69-70 and accompanying text.
17 Benchoff v. Colleran, 404 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 2005) ("Moreover, the abuse of the
writ doctrine's ongoing validity as a means of interpreting 'second or successive' has been
strongly suggested by the Supreme Court, which has implied that § 2244 is a statutory extension
and codification of the equitable principles of the doctrine.").
18 See, e.g., id.; I HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 3.2, at 120-21 n.37 (noting that the
Court interpreted "second or successive" by looking to the pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ
doctrine); Dow et al., supra note 9, at 560.
19 Dunn v. Singletary, 168 F.3d 440, 442 (1 th Cir. 1999); cf Stevenson, supra, note 8, at
771 ("[A] dominant metaphor in the debates over... AEDPA was that of 'successive bites of
the apple."'); Sarah A. Sulkowski, Comment, The AEDPA and the Incompetent Death-Row
Prisoner: Why FordClaims Should Be Exempt from the One-Year and One-Bite Rules, 6 LOY.
"
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or successive" in § 2244(b), the Seventh Circuit stated that adopting
the alternate interpretation of that phrase, as a term of art that
incorporates pre-AEDPA
principles, would give habeas petitioners
' 20
"two bites at the apple."'
On the contrary, the opposite conclusion is true. Instead of
providing petitioners with multiple bites at the "apple," interpreting
"second or successive" to incorporate the abuse of the writ principles
provides habeas petitioners with the opportunity to fully present all
their claims in a habeas petition. This interpretation ensures that
claims that are not available to a habeas petitioner at the time of their
first habeas petition, because the claims are not known or do not yet
exist, can be heard in a subsequent habeas petition if raising the claim
does not abuse the writ of habeas corpus. In short, it ensures that
habeas petitioners get onefiull bite at the apple.
In contrast, a literal reading or plain meaning interpretation of
"second or successive" forecloses federal review of all constitutional
claims that could not have been raised in a petitioner's initial habeas
petition. 12 1 Consider, for example, In re Provenzano.122 Provenzano, a
Florida death row inmate, sought authorization from the Eleventh
Circuit to file a second or successive habeas application under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 123 Provenzano's habeas application raised,
among other things, a claim that his imminent execution would
violate the Eighth Amendment because Florida's administration of
lethal injection constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 24 The
Eleventh Circuit recognized that Provenzano could not have raised
this claim "at the time he filed his first federal habeas petition,
because at that time Florida did not use lethal injection as the means
of execution.' 25 Despite the fact that he could not have raised this
constitutional claim earlier, however, the Eleventh Circuit, reading §
2244(b) literally, held that this claim was "second or successive" and

J. PUB. INT. L. 57, 59 (2004) ("[AEDPA] limited second or successive petitions by instituting a
'one bite at the apple' regime ....).
120ln re Page, 179 F.3d 1024, 1025 (7th Cir. 1999).
121See, e.g., In re Davis, 121 F.3d 952, 956 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a habeas petition
is "second or successive" under the "plain wording of § 2244(b)" even though the petitioner
sought "to assert his Ford claim at the first properly available opportunity ....");see also
Randal S. Jeffrey, Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions and Section 2255 Motions After the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: Emerging Proceduraland Substantive
Issues, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 43, 71-72 (noting the problems with a literal reading of the 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b) and advocating for a nonliteral reading of the statute).
122215 F.3d 1233 (11 th Cir. 2000).
23
1 1d. at 1234-35.
24
1 1d. at 1235.
25
1 Id. at 1235-36.
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barred because it did not fit within either of the two narrow statutory
exceptions in that section. 1 6 Accordingly, Provenzano was never able
to raise his potentially meritorious 27 Eighth Amendment challenge to
the method of his execution in federal court because of the Eleventh
Circuit's literal interpretation of AEDPA.
Similarly, both the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, interpreting
"second or successive" according to the plain meaning of the words,
have refused to allow petitioners to raise Ford claims in numerically
second habeas petitions even though they could not have raised the
28
claims in their initial habeas petitioners or at any earlier time.
Indeed the Fifth Circuit held § 2244(b) barred a habeas petition, even
though the petitioner "asserted[ed] his Ford claim at the first properly
available opportunity" because, the court noted, "we cannot disregard
the plain wording of § 2244(b).' 2 9 In each of these cases, following a
literal reading of "second or successive" results in the conclusion that
federal courts are without authority to consider or hear claims
asserting constitutional violations even though those claims could not
have been asserted at any other time. 30 It is evident then, as the
Supreme Court stated in Martinez-Villareal, that the implications of a
literal reading of "second or successive"
under AEDPA are "far
' 31
reaching and seemingly perverse.'
Therefore, instead of preventing two bites at the apple, a literal
reading of "second or successive" actually prevents a petitioner from
receiving one full bite of the apple by shutting the door of the federal
courts on constitutional claims that cannot be raised in the petitioner's
initial habeas application.' 32 This result does not fit with the purpose
of AEDPA, which was to limit only multiple, abusive bites at the
apple and not to prevent one full bite. 33 As one commentator has
noted:
1261d. at 1236.
127
Id. at 1235. On December 15, 2006, Governor Jeb Bush instituted a moratorium on all
executions in Florida because of concerns regarding the "humanity and constitutionality of
lethal injections." Adam Liptak & Terry Aguayo, After Problem Execution, Governor Bush
Suspends the Death Penalty in Florida,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,2006, at Al1.
128See In re Medina 109 F.3d 1556 (11th Cir. 1997); In re Davis, 121 F.3d 952 (5th Cir.
1997). 29
1 1n re Davis, 121 F.3d at 956.
13OThe particular problems for Ford claims under a strict interpretation of AEDPA's
second or successive limitations have been well documented. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 8,
at 740-51; Sulkowski, supra note 119.
131Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644 (1998).
132 See Stevenson, supra, note 8, at 772 ("AEDPA's successive petition rules can operate
to foreclose federal habeas corpus review of claims that could not have been litigated at the time
of the first habeas corpus petition.").
133 1d. ("[B]oth the language of the provisions and the underlying legislative history
strongly suggest that Congress intended to ensure that petitioners would have at least one full,
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Applying the no-second-bite rule makes no sense when a
prior petition gave the prisoner what amounts to no bite at the
apple-because the prior petition involved a different apple,
because no bite was taken when the apple previously was
before the court, or because no bite could have been taken at
that time because the claim had not yet come into existence or
would not have been cognizable at the time of the earlier
petition. 134
Thus, "[i]f a claim cannot be raised at the time of the first [habeas]
petition because of legal or factual unavailability, the concept of 'one
bite' requires that the prisoner be permitted to raise that claim once it
becomes available."' 135 Interpreting "second or successive" to
incorporate the pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ principles ensures that
habeas petitioners get one full bite at the apple by permitting
numerically second petitions to raise constitutional claims that could
not have been raised in prior habeas applications.
The second reason why "second or successive" should be
interpreted as incorporating the abuse of the writ principles is because
a literal reading of the phrase creates illogical requirements for the
filing of initial habeas petitions. Under the Supreme Court's holding
in Martinez-Villareal, a claim raised in a numerically second petition
is not "second or successive" under AEDPA if the claim was raised in
the petitioner's initial habeas petition but dismissed for procedural
reasons.136 Some claims, however, such as Ford incompetency-to-beexecuted claims, generally cannot be raised in a petitioner's initial
habeas application because they are not procedurally proper. 137 Under
a literal reading of § 2244(b), however, any claims raised for the first
time in a numerically second petition are always barred as "second or
successive."' 138 Therefore, in jurisdictions that read § 2244(b) literally,
habeas petitioners must raise Ford and other such claims in their

fair opportunity to raise each meritorious claim at each of the levels of federal court habeas
corpus review.").
134
2 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRAcTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 28.3a, at 275 (2d ed. Supp. 1997) (emphasis in original).
135Stevenson,
36

supra note 8, at 772.

1 See Stewart, 523 U.S. at 637.
137
Stevenson, supra note 8, at 750.
38
1 See In re Davis, 121 F.3d 952, 956 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding a habeas petition is "second

or successive" under the "plain wording of § 2244(b)" even though the petitioner sought "to
assert his Ford claim at the first properly available opportunity ....");
In re Medina, 109 F.3d
1556, 1565 (1 th Cir. 1997) (same).
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even though the court cannot hear the
initial habeas applications
139
time.
that
at
claim
Petitioners must then waste time and resources "needlessly
litigating a Ford [or other similar] claim at the wrong time" in their
initial habeas application in order to preserve the claim so that it can
be raised, if warranted, at the proper time in a subsequent habeas
petition. 140 One district court judge noted this problem that results
from a plain meaning interpretation of "second or successive" in light
of Martinez-Villareal's holding: the judge stated that if "second or
successive" was interpreted literally, "[pletitioners might then attempt
to raise multiple unripe and unexhausted claims (claims with only a
potential of ever arising) in first petitions, if only to preserve a right to
bring such claims later."14 ' This potential result has caused several
lower federal courts to reject a literal reading of "second or
successive" because "[t]hat reading of § 2244(b) would surely create
a powerful and strange incentive to raise a claim at a time when it
must be dismissed.' ' 142 Interpreting "second or successive" as a term
of art, however, avoids this illogical result.
Finally, the third reason why "second or successive" must be
interpreted as a term of art that incorporates pre-AEDPA standards is
because a literal reading of the phrase would raise serious
constitutional issues. The Suspension Clause of the Constitution
provides: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.', 143 Courts and commentators have both
recognized that a literal reading of § 2244(b) might violate the
Suspension Clause by foreclosing all possibility of federal habeas
review of constitutional claims raised by petitioners in certain
situations. 144 In James v. Walsh,145 for instance, the Second Circuit
noted that "[d]enial of habeas relief in the present case may implicate
the Suspension Clause, because it would constitute a complete denial
of any collateral review of a claim that arose only after [the
139Stevenson, supra note

8, at 750-51.

140Id.
141Poland v. Stewart, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1039 n.3 (D. Ariz. 1999).
42
1 Schomhorst v. Anderson, 77 F. Supp. 2d 944, 949 (S.D. Ind. 1999);

see also Poland,41
2d at 1039 n.3.
F. Supp.
43
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
2.
'4E.g., James v. Walsh, 308 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2002); Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118
F.3d 628 (9th Cir. 1997); 2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, § 28.4a, at 1464; Deborah L.
Stahlkopf, Note, A Dark Day for Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions Under the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1115, 1128-36
(1998).
145
308 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2002).
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petitioner] filed [his initial habeas petition].' 46 Because a literal
reading of "second or successive" would have denied the petitioner
habeas review, the court rejected a literal reading of the statute and
interpreted 47 "second or successive" according to pre-AEDPA
standards. 1
Because of these constitutional concerns, AEDPA's "second or
successive" language should be interpreted as a term of art that
incorporates the pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ standards. One
well-established cannon of statutory construction provides that
"where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to
avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to
the intent of Congress.' 48 The Supreme Court has already applied
this rule of statutory construction to reject a literal reading of a
different section of AEDPA. 149 Similarly, in the context of § 2244(b),
a literal interpretation of "second or successive" raises serious
constitutional problems by barring any federal habeas review of some
constitutional claims. 50 Under the rules of statutory construction
then, the statute should be construed to adopt the pre-AEDPA abuse
of the writ principles. This interpretation of "second or successive" is
proper because it avoids the constitutional problems raised by a literal
151
interpretation and it is not contrary to the intent of Congress.
Therefore, interpreting "second or successive" to incorporate
pre-AEDPA principles is a proper construction of the statute.
Accordingly, the interpretation of "second or successive" adopted
by a majority of the circuits is the proper interpretation of that phrase.
The alternate interpretation of that phrase, applying the plain meaning
of the words "second or successive," closes the doors of the federal
46Id.at 168.
147
Id.
48
1 DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
149Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (holding that,
even though statutory language precluded judicial review, AEDPA did not deprive federal
courts of jurisdiction to review the habeas petition of an alien who was found to be deportable).
150See, e.g., supra notes 78, 91, 96, 108-110 and accompanying text.
151As one commentator has noted, "[tihere is no indication that Congress intended to
supersede [the] established meaning [of what constitutes a successive petition under
pre-AEDPA law] rather than incorporate it into its undefined term 'second or successive."'
Jeffrey, supra note 124, at 71. This lack of indication of congressional intent is likely the result
of the poor statutory drafting of AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) ("All
we can say is that in a world of silk purses and pigs' ears, [AEDPA] is not a silk purse of
statutory drafting."); Stevenson, supra, note 8, at 705 ("As the courts and commentators have
pointed out, AEDPA is replete with ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies."); Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Forward to the Fifth Edition of 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 4, at v
("[AEDPA's] new rules are still being laboriously disentangled .... The statutory language
teems with problems and non-obvious alternative interpretations that need to be identified and
worked out ...").
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courts to review some constitutional claims raised in habeas corpus
petitions, creates illogical incentives for habeas petitioners to raise
claims at a time when they must be procedurally dismissed, and raises
serious constitutional questions under the Suspension Clause.
V. CONCLUSION

"It must never be forgotten that the writ of habeas corpus is the
precious safeguard of personal liberty and there is no higher duty than
to maintain it unimpaired." 152 Indeed, the Founders considered the
writ "the highest safeguard of liberty." 1 53 An improper interpretation
of AEDPA's limitations on "second or successive" habeas petitions,
however, jeopardizes the availability of the writ of habeas corpus to
redress constitutional violations. Indeed, the case law is replete with
examples of federal courts shutting their doors and refusing to hear
viable claims of constitutional violations brought by petitioners who
raised their claims properly at the first available opportunity because
they followed a literal reading of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 54 Moreover,
there are other significant problems that are
raised by a plain meaning
55
interpretation of "second or successive."',
The interpretation of "second or successive" adopted by a majority
of the circuits avoids these problems by interpreting that phrase in §
2244(b) as a term of art that incorporates the pre-AEDPA abuse of the
writ principles. A minority of the circuit courts, however, have
continued to read § 2244(b) literally and interpret the phrase "second
or successive" according to the plain meaning of those terms. One
circuit court has flatly rejected the interpretation of "second or
successive" in § 2244(b) adopted by a majority of the circuits creating
a clear split among the circuits. Other circuits have been inconsistent
in their interpretation of that phrase, interpreting it as a term of art in
some cases but interpreting it literally in others. Accordingly,
the
156
Supreme Court needs to resolve this split among the circuits.
52

1

Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939) (citing Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)

163 (1873)).
153Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961).
154
See, e.g., supra notes 78, 91, 96, 108-110 and accompanying text.
55
1 See supra notes 137-154 and accompanying text.
156After this Comment was prepared for publication, the Court requested supplemental
briefing on the issue of whether a habeas petitioner's application is "second or successive"
under AEDPA in a case set for argument before the Court on April 18, 2007. See Panetti v.
Quarterman, 75 U.S.L.W. 3530 (2007) ("The parties are directed to file supplemental briefs
addressing the following question: Must petitioner's habeas application be dismissed as 'second
or successive' pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244?").
Previously during the October 2006 Term, however, the Court denied two petitions for a
writ of certiorari that directly raised this issue as the primary question to the Court. See Lambert
v. Buss, 75 U.S.L.W. 3497 (2007); White v. Houk, 127 S. Ct. 1263 (2007). The questions
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Although the Court's prior decisions imply its approval of the
majority interpretation, the Court needs to clearly decide the matter so
that habeas petitioner's are no longer subjected to varying
interpretations of AEDPA's restriction on "second or successive"
petitions. When the Court decides the matter, it should adopt the
majority interpretation of "second or successive" as a term of art that
incorporates the pre-AEDPA abuse of the writ principles. This
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) is proper because it provides
habeas petitioners with one full "bite at the apple" as intended under
AEDPA.

MARK T. PAVKOVt

presented in the petitions for a writ of certiorari in both White and Lambert centered on the
proper interpretation of "second or successive" in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). The first question
presented in White's certiorari petition was:
Is a petition for writ of habeas corpus that raises a claim that could not have been
raised in a previous petition a second in time first petition under the abuse of the
writ doctrine and an extension of the principles enunciated in Stewart v.
Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637 (1998), or a 'second or successive' petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, White v. Houk, 127 S. Ct. 1263 (2007) (No. 06-7858). The
first question presented in Lambert's certiorari petition was:
Where a prisoner raises a previously unripened constitutional claim for the first
time in a petition filed after the federal courts have already rejected the prisoner's
initial habeas application, is the 'second-in-time' petition considered a 'first
petition' or would such a filing be a 'second or successive habeas corpus
application' within the meaning of AEDPA?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lambert v. Buss, 75 U.S.L.W. 3497 (2007) (No. 06-7758).
The second question presented was: "Does the 'second or successive' language of 28 U.S.C.
2244(b)(2) incorporate this Court's abuse of the writ doctrine?" Id.
t J.D. 2007, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Michael Benza and Randall Leeman Jr. for their insight and guidance during our work
in Professor Benza's Death Penalty Lab that helped me develop this Comment. I also would like
to thank my wife, Jonelle, for her unending love, patience, and support, and my Lord, Jesus
Christ, for His unending grace.

